Abstract: Bohmian mechanics is an alternative interpretation of quantum mechanics. We outline the main characteristics of its non-relativistic formulation. Most notably it does provide a simple solution to the infamous measurement problem of quantum mechanics. Presumably the most common objection against Bohmian mechanics is based on its non-locality and its apparent conict with relativity and quantum eld theory. However, several models for a quantum eld theoretical generalization do exist. We give a non-technical account of some of these models.
Introduction
This note reviews Bohmian mechanics, an alternative interpretation (or modication) of quantum mechanics. Bohmian mechanics reproduces all predictions of quantum mechanics but introduces a radically dierent perception of the underlying processes. Like most alternative interpretations it is not distinguishable from standard quantum mechanics by e.g. any experimentum crucis.
We start out by a few historical remarks in Sec. 2 before we outline the main characteristics of its non-relativistic formulation in Sec. 3. Here we put special emphasis on the status of observables other than position. However, the most important feature of the theory is its solution to the infamous measurement problem of quantum mechanics (see Sec. 3 
.3).
We then turn to the question of relativistic and quantum eld theoretical generalizations of the theory. Several such generalizations do exist and in Sec. 4 we give a non-technical account of some of these models. We also address the question what it actually means to generalize a theory and make a little digression to the eld of intertheory relations.
However, before we get started, we would like to make some general remarks concerning the interpretation of quantum mechanics. These may help to put the debate on Bohmian mechanics into the wider context.
Reections on the interpretation of quantum mechanics
The interpretation of quantum mechanics has been discussed ad nauseam and the engagement with it can be a frustrating and disappointing business. This subject matter continues to produce an endless stream of publications 1 and nobody can reasonably expect this issue to be settled in the future. So much the worse, the dierent camps stand in erce opposition and one gets the impression that this is an other obstacle for reaching substantial progress.
However, what do we actually mean by progress? Perhaps, in a situation like this, we need to reconsider our criteria and standards for progress and success.
Given that the foundation of quantum mechanics has a smooth transition to philosophy we may learn something from a similar debate there.
Chapter 15 of Bertrand Russell's little book The Problems of Philosophy (1912) is titled The Value of Philosophy and starts with a remark which applies just as well to the interpretation of quantum mechanics:
[W]hat is the value of philosophy and why it ought to be studied. It is the more necessary to consider this question, in view of the fact that many men, under the inuence of science or of practical aairs, are inclined to doubt whether philosophy is anything better than innocent but useless triing, hair-splitting distinctions, and controversies on matters concerning which knowledge is impossible.
And indeed, many practically minded physicists regard the interpretation of quantum mechanics as pointless since no direct applications follow from it.
Russell continues, that although philosophy does aim at knowledge which gives unity and system to the body of the sciences, it admittedly had little success in this respect and could only answer very few of its questions denitely. However, more important than the answers are the questions it asks:
Philosophy is to be studied, not for the sake of any denite answers to its questions since no denite answers can, as a rule, be known to be true, but rather for the sake of the questions themselves; because these questions enlarge our conception of what is possible, enrich our intellectual imagination and diminish the dogmatic assurance which closes the mind against speculation (...) Now, rated by this measure, the debate on the interpretation of quantum mechanics is a story of spectacular success indeed. Agreed, only few questions have been 1 Cabello (2000) gives a bibliographic guide to the foundation of quantum mechanics (and quantum information) and collects more than 10 5 entries. (Bohm 1952) . However, the reception of this work was unfriendly, to say the least. See e.g. Myrvold (2003) for the early objections against the de Broglie-Bohm theory.
Since the 70s John Bell was one of the very few prominent physicists who stood up for the theory. Many papers in his anthology Since the 1990th some new groups and researchers joined the eld (D. Dürr, S. Goldstein and N. Zanghi, A. Valentini, G. Grübl and others) and it came to the formation of dierent schools. Dürr, Goldstein and Zanghi (1992) coined the term Bohmian mechanics which stands for a specic reading of the theory. While mathematically equivalent to Bohm's exposition in 1952, it is inuenced by Bell's (and also de Broglie's) presentation of the theory (e.g. it puts no emphasis on the quantum potential 3 ).
2 The above-mentioned should not be misconceived as a license for arbitrary speculations.
The possible answers still have to come under scrutiny.
3 It should be noted that while all of the before mentioned Bohm students use the quantum potential formulation, the presentation of the theory in Hiley (1993) and Holland (1993) shows dierences nevertheless. In addition changed also Bohm's own interpretation of the theory in the course of time. However, this is clearly not unusual and by no means specic to the de Broglie-Bohm theory. We just mention this point here to call into attention that given these dierent readings of the theory talking about the de Broglie-Bohm theory may need further qualication. 3 The non-relativistic formulation
The key idea of the (non-relativistic) de Broglie-Bohm theory (de Broglie 1927 , Bohm 1952 ) is to describe a physical system not by the wavefunction, ψ, alone but by the couple of wavefunction and conguration, i.e. the position, Q i , of the corresponding objects (e.g. electrons, atoms, or even macroscopic entities).
The theory is now dened by three postulates which will be explained in the following 4 :
1. The wavefunction satises the usual Schrödinger equation ih ∂ψ ∂t = Hψ 2. The particle velocities (a real vector eld on conguration space) are given by the so-called guidance equation:
With Q(t) = (Q 1 (t), · · · , Q N (t)) the conguration of the system, m k denotes the mass of particle k, ∇ k is the nabla operator applied to its coordinates and S the phase of the wavefunction in the polar representation ψ = Re ī h S .
3. The position-distribution, ρ, of an ensemble of systems which are described by the wavefunction, ψ, is given by ρ = |ψ| 2 . This postulate is called the quantum equilibrium hypothesis.
Postulate 1 shows that ordinary quantum mechanics is embedded in the de BroglieBohm theory and that everything which is known about solutions of the Schrödinger equation remains valid and important. The de Broglie-Bohm theory is sometimes called a hidden variable theory since it supplements quantum mechanics with additional variables, i.e. the particle positions. However, this terminology is a bit awkward since the positions are not really hidden.
4 More detailed expositions of the de Broglie-Bohm theory can be found in Holland (1993) , Bohm and Hiley (1993) , Cushing (1994) , Dürr (2001 ) Goldstein (2002 and Passon (2004) .
Postulate 2 equips the particles with a dynamic which depends on the wavefunction. Metaphorically speaking the quantum particles are riding on (or guided by) the ψ-eld.Thus the particles are moving on continuous trajectories and possess a well dened position at every instant. The proof for global existence of the Bohmian trajectories is given by Berndl at al. (1995) and was later extended by Teufel and Tumulka (2005) .
The form of the guidance equation can be easily motivated.
5 One may take the classical relation between velocity (v), current (j) and density (ρ):
and inserts the quantum mechanical probability current, j, and the probability density ρ:
A dierent motivation of the guidance equation based on symmetry arguments is given in Dürr et al. (1992) . Since all measurements can be expressed in terms of position (e.g. pointer positions) this amounts to full accordance with all predictions of ordinary quantum mechanics.
Further more ensures the quantum equilibrium hypothesis that the de BroglieBohm theory does not allow for an experimental violation of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle notwithstanding the well dened position the particles possess in principle (Valentini 1991) .
However, while it is ensured that the quantum equilibrium hypothesis is satised for a conguration which is |ψ| 2 distributed once, it is by no means clear why any conguration should be accordingly distributed initially. At rst this seems like 5 However, its form is not unique. One can add an arbitrary divergence-free vector-eld and arrive at the same statistical predictions (Deotto and Ghirardi 1998 Valentini (1991 Valentini ( , 1992 who claims that the dynamics of the de Broglie-Bohm theory gives rise to a relaxation into an approximate (i.e. coarse grained) equilibrium distribution for an enlarged set of initial congurations. However, there exists a more convincing approach to justify the quantum equilibrium hypothesis. Work by Dürr et al. (1992) shows, that the quantum equilibrium hypothesis follows by the law of large numbers from the assumption that the initial conguration of the universe is typical for the |Ψ| 2 distribution (with Ψ being the wavefunction of the universe). This derivation resembles the way Maxwell's velocity distribution for a classical gas follows from the typicality of the phase-space conguration of the corresponding gas (Dürr et al. 2004 ).
According to this view the quantum equilibrium hypothesis is no postulate of the de Broglie-Bohm theory but can be derived from it. 
Due to the similarity with the classical Hamilton-Jacobi equation (for the action S) the term ∝h 2 has been baptized quantum potential. Within the HamiltonJacobi theory the particle velocity is constraint to m · v = ∇S, which corresponds to the guidance equation of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. If one adopts the quantum potential formulation the motion along the Bohmian trajectories can be thought of as taking place under the action of a novel quantum-force.
However, the guidance equation can be motivated e.g. by symmetry arguments (Dürr et al. 1992 ) and needs no recourse to the Hamilton-Jacobi theory. In Goldstein (1996) it is argued that moreover the quantum potential formulation is misleading since it suggests that the de Broglie-Bohm theory is just classical mechanics with an additional potential (or force) term. But the de Broglie-Bohm theory is a rst-order theory (i.e. the velocity is constrained by the position already) and this important trait is disguised in the quantum potential formulation.
Whether this ambiguity in the formulation of the de Broglie-Bohm theory should be viewed as a substantial debate or a secondary matter depends on the context. These two readings of the theory have certainly a great deal in common and 6 At the risk of being imprecise we gave only a short sketch of the dierent strategies to motivate the quantum equilibrium hypothesis. For details the reader is referred to the original literature.
mechanics the distinction between these dierent schools is usually irrelevant.
However, more detailed discussions which involve subtleties regarding e.g. the status of the wavefunction, particle properties and philosophical implications of the de Broglie-Bohm theory in general have to pay attention to these dierences.
Characteristic features
After the denition of the theory we want to discuss some of its characteristic features and try to put them into the wider context.
Determinism
The de Broglie-Bohm theory is deterministic since the wavefunction and the conguration at a given time x the time evolution of the system uniquely. However,
given the quantum equilibrium hypothesis the predictive power of the theory is not enlarged compared to ordinary quantum mechanics. All predictions of the theory remain probabilistic but in contrast to ordinary quantum mechanics, the randomness is arising from averaging over ignorance.
However, it should be noted that to many adherents of the de Broglie-Bohm theory, determinism is not the key feature of the theory. For example Bohm and Vigier (1954) have developed a hidden variable model which contains a stochastic background-eld and in a later section we will discuss a eld-theoretical generalization of the de Broglie-Bohm theory which also contains stochastic eects.
Moreover do many Bohmians appreciate the GRW model which includes a stochastic term into the Schrödinger equation to describe the wavefunction collapse. Short but to the point: not the indeterminism of quantum mechanics but rather its vague account of the measurement process created discomfort with the ordinary formulation and inspired the development of these alternative models.
Complementarity dispensable
Many quantum phenomena (e.g. interference eects) need both, the wave and particle aspect of matter for their explanation. The notion of complementarity was developed as an attempt to justify this common use of mutually contradictory concepts. Within the de Broglie-Bohm theory matter is described by a wave-like quantity (the wavefunction) and a particle-like quantity (the position). Hence, the notion of complementarity is not needed.
Non-locality
Since the wavefunction is dened on the conguration space, the guidance equation of a N -particle system links the motion of every particle to the positions of the other particles at the same time. In principle the particles can inuence each other over arbitrary distances. However, this non-locality is needed in order to Physics and Philosophy Issn: ?? ? Id: You need not to ll this slot explain the violation of Bell's inequality. Moreover ensures the quantum equilibrium hypothesis that the correlation of space-like separated particles can not be used for faster than light communication (Valentini 1991) . Finally does the non-locality of the de Broglie-Bohm theory vanishes if the state is not entangled.
Whether this non-locality is viewed as an unacceptable feature depends on the attitude towards the problem of non-locality in quantum mechanics in general.
Following the work of Bell and the experimental conrmation of quantum mechanics in tests of the Bell inequality it became widely accepted that quantum mechanics itself is non-local. However, the precise meaning of the term nonlocal is far from being unique and their exists a vast literature on that topic. A thorough discussion of that issue is far beyond the scope of the present paper (see e.g. Cushing 1987 ). However, one can reasonably state, that the non-locality of the de Broglie-Bohm theory is more explicit (i.e. dynamical) than the nonseparability of ordinary quantum mechanics.
Be that as it may, given that the de Broglie-Bohm theory is a reformulation of non-relativistic quantum mechanics, any action-at-a-distance should be no threat anyway. It is turned into an objection against the theory if one argues that no Bohm-like relativistic or quantum eld theoretical generalization of the theory can be given. In Sec. 4 we will discuss the existing models for such generalizations.
Measurements deserve no special role Observables other than position and contextuality
Much more important than being deterministic or having particle trajectories is the novelty of the de Broglie-Bohm theory with regard to the status of observables other than position. Within ordinary quantum mechanics the identication of observables with linear Hilbert space operators is usually regarded as the key innovation. Their non-commutativity is believed to be the mathematical embodiment of the deep epistemological lesson quantum mechanics teaches us.
The de Broglie-Bohm theory takes a dierent route. First, it includes the particle positions (which are described by real coordinates, and not by some operator) into the state description. Second, it distinguishes these variables, i.e. the outcome of every experiment is determined by the wavefunction and the conguration. Unlike position, spin is not primitive, i.e., no actual discrete degree of freedom, analogous to the actual positions of the particles, added to the state description in order to deal with particles with spin.
Roughly speaking, spin is merely in the wave function. (Dürr et al. 1996, p.11) In common jargon these properties are called contextual, i.e. the measurement does not reveal a pre-existing value of a system-property but depends crucially on the experimental arrangement (the context). al. (2004) it is shown how operators naturally arise in the de Broglie-Bohm theory. They are derived quantities which are coding the probability distributions for certain measurement-like (p.11) experiments. This leads us to the next section which is devoted to a discussion of how the de Broglie-Bohm theory treats measurements and in particular how it solves the measurement problem.
7 In fact, Holland (1993, p.91 ) introduces local expectation values for these quantities which are supposed to correspond to their actual value along the trajectories. Averaged over the quantum equilibrium distribution these local expectation values reproduce the quantum mechanical predictions. However, one might object that these properties are redundant since the position is already enough to reproduce all experimental predictions of quantum mechanics.
Further more they are not conserved along the Bohmian trajectories.
8 In Dürr et al. (2004, p.64 ) it is argued that the term contextual property is actually misleading because it suggests that e.g. spin is still a property. But properties which are merely contextual are no properties at all (Dürr et al. 2004, p.67 The argument runs like this: Given a two-valued observable S with eigenvectors ψ 1 and ψ 2 . Let Φ 0 denote its wavefunction in the ready-state and Φ 1 (Φ 2 ) the state of the apparatus if the measurement yields
, 2}) holds, withÛ the time evolution of the combined system. A general state will be a superposition:
Now, given B, the action ofÛ on this state yields:
While individual measurements always result in either the state Φ 1 or Φ 2 , this is a superposition of dierent pointer states. Thus, in contrast to our experience quantum mechanics does not leave the joint object-apparatus system in a de- To deny A needs some sort of hidden (or actually additional) variables. The de Broglie-Bohm theory is a prominent example for this strategy and we explain 9 In fact, Maudlin (1995) introduces three slightly dierent formulations of the measurement problem. We refer only to the rst formulation (hence, Maudlin labels the following propositions 1.A, 1.B and 1.C).
10 Our argument relied on simplifying assumption like an ideal measurement and pure states for both, object and apparatus. One might suspect that the problem is only generated by these unrealistic conditions. However, even in the completely general case employing density operators (i.e. mixed states), non-ideal measurements, interactions with the environment etc.pp.
the conclusion remains essentially unaltered (see Bassi and Ghirardi (2000) and Grübl (2003) To deny B leads to so-called collapse theories which abandon the strict linear time evolution of the system. For example Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber (1986) have developed such a non-linear model which describes this mechanism. Also does von Neumann's proposal of a collapse of the wavefunction fall into this category. However, von Neumann (like all other standard presentations of quantum mechanics) did not specify the physical conditions under which the linear evolution fails.
Finally one may question C and the many-world interpretation can be construed as a solution of the measurement problem along this line.
Eective collapse in the de Broglie-Bohm theory Suppose for example that the measurement yields outcome 1, i.e. the initial position of the Bohm particle was such that the deterministic evolution developed into a conguration that lies within the support of ψ 1 ⊗ Φ 1 . The Bohm particles will be guided by this state because the non-overlapping ψ 2 ⊗ Φ 2 -part is dynamically irrelevant. Thus the de Broglie-Bohm theory provides a so-called eective collapse of the wavefunction. Given the quantum equilibrium hypothesis the probability for this eective collapse obeys Born's rule.
Relativistic and quantum eld theoretical generalizations
Presumably the most common objection 12 against the de Broglie-Bohm theory is based on its non-locality and its apparent conict with relativity and quantum 11 Maudlin (1995 p.11 This may even be possible (see for example the Bell-type models below), however, on closer inspection this requirement seems to be too narrow nevertheless. One only needs to consider the history of physics, where many important features of a given theory did not carry over to its generalization. In particular does QFT provides examples for the departure from concepts which were accepted in nonrelativistic quantum mechanics. Or to put it dierently: one should expect (or at least not exclude from the outset) new concepts to enter a theory if it is extended to new areas.
Another more reasonable demand for a quantum eld theoretical generalization of the de Broglie-Bohm theory is that it (i) reproduces the predictions of QFT and (ii) includes the non-relativistic formulation as a limiting case. The last requirement seems necessary to regard a model as a generalization. In Sec.4.4 we will come back to this important question.
However, the existing models for Bohm-like QFT concentrate on still another feature of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. They suggest, that the essence of the de Broglie-Bohm theory is its clear ontology, i.e. that it attributes being to certain entities. In common jargon, the theory possesses beables. This term was coined by Bell (1976) and is meant in contrast to observable i.e. emphasizes that any observation (i.e. measurement) deserves no special role in the formulation of a fundamental theory. In Bell's own words:
In particular we will exclude the notion of observable in favor of that of beable. The beables of the theory are those elements which might correspond to elements of reality, to things which exist. [...] Indeed observation and observers must be made out of beables. (Bell 1986, p.174) The beables of the non-relativistic de Broglie-Bohm theory happen to be particles (moving on continuous and deterministic trajectories). In what follows we will also come across eld-beables and indeterministic dynamics in Bohm-like theories. As long as this beables provide the means to record measurement outcomes they can be used to build a Bohm-like model.
The Bohm-Dirac theory
We begin with the question of a relativistic generalization. Already in Bohm to the non-relativistic case a particle velocity can be dened by the ratio of these two quantities:
with:
In this way the description is complemented by the conguration, i.e. the beables of this theory are particles as in the non-relativistic formulation.
However, in the many-particle case this theory is not Lorentz covariant since it uses a common time for all particles. The frame-of-reference in which ρ = ψ † ψ holds is distinguished (Berndl et al. 1996) . But this non-covariance is only relevant on the level of individual particles. The statistical predictions of the Bohm-Dirac theory are the same as for the usual Dirac theory because (i) by construction it is ensured that they hold in the distinguished frame and (ii) they transform properly under Lorentz transformations. Hence, the preferred frameof-reference can not be identied experimentally.
In fact, as shown by Dürr et al. (1999) , it is even possible to formally restore Lorentz invariance for the Bohm-Dirac theory by introducing additional structure.
Dürr et al. introduce a preferred slicing of space-time, determined by a Lorentz invariant law.
In order to deal with anti-particles one might invoke the Dirac-sea concept, i.e.
introduce particle beables for every negative energy state (Bohm and Hiley 1993, p.276) .
Other approaches to develop a relativistic de Broglie-Bohm theory use the concept of the multi-time wavefunction ψ(q 1 , t 1 , · · · , q N , t N ), i.e. introduce a dierent time variable for each particle. However, the resulting set of coupled Dirac equations can only be solved in the absence of interaction potentials. See Tumulka (2006) and the references therein for a more detailed discussion of these models.
However, it is generally agreed that the unication of quantum mechanics and relativity needs a quantum eld theoretical framework anyway. We therefore turn to the eld theoretical generalizations of the de Broglie-Bohm theory. Here several competing models do exist.
Quantum eld theoretical generalizations
We have learned in Sec. Field-beables for bosons and particle beables for fermions Already in his seminal paper in 1952 Bohm presented a way of generalizing his causal interpretation to the electromagnetic eld. The additional variables (or beables) were not particles but elds. The quantum state is thereby a wavefunctional which guides the eld beable. This approach can be extended to the various bosonic elds (see e.g. Bohm 1984 , Holland 1993 , Kaloyerou 1996 . For example the second-quantized real Klein-Gordon eld is described by a wavefunctional Ψ(φ(x), t), which satises the Schrödinger equation:
The corresponding guidance equation for the eld beable φ(x, t) reads
where S is the phase of the wavefunctional Ψ.
In these models the conguration space is the innite dimensional space of eld congurations. Since there does not exist a Lebesgue volume measure on these spaces the rigorous denitions of an equivariant measure, i.e. the analogue of |ψ(q)| 2 dq, is problematic (Tumulka 2006, p.12) .
For fermionic quantum elds Bohm et al. argue that a causal interpretation in terms of eld beables cannot be constructed (Bohm, 1987) and (Bohm and Hiley 1993, p.276) . Instead Bohm and Hiley propose to introduce particle beables for fermions according to the Bohm-Dirac theory mentioned above. In fact, models by Holland and Valentini which try to provide eld-beables for fermions did not succeed (Struyve and Westman 2006, p.1) .
Field-beables for bosons and no beable-status for fermions
Inspired by the diculties to construct a Bohm-like theory for fermions with eld-beables, Struyve and Westman (2006) propose a dierent direction. They note, that e.g. the property spin can be described in the de Broglie-Bohm theory without assigning a beable status to it. They suggest, that the same may be done for the fermionic degrees of freedom. Since fermions are always gauge-coupled to bosonic elds it is sucient to introduce beables for the bosons.
Technically their work is similar to Bohm's model with eld-beables for bosons mentioned above. They introduce a specic representation for the bosonic eldoperators and trace out the fermionic degrees of freedom. Their beables are the transversal part of the vector potential. In Struyve and Westman (2006) this approach is carried out for QED, but it has a natural extension to other gauge theories.
collapse, i.e. how the total wavefunctional evolves to a superposition of nonoverlapping wavefunctionals. However, one might still worry if this model is capable to contain a record of the measurement outcome, for example in terms of pointer positions. They reply to this concern, that (...) if we continue our quantum description of the experiment, the direction of the macroscopic needle will get correlated with the radiation that is scattered o (or thermally emitted from, etc.) the needle.
Because these states of radiation will be macroscopically distinct they will be non-overlapping in the conguration space of elds and hence the outcome of the experiment will be recorded in the eld beables of the radiation. 13 This model is formulated on a spatial lattice with points enumerated by l = 1, 2, · · · , L (the time remains continuous). For each lattice site a fermion number operator is dened with eigenvalues F (l) = 0, 1, 2, · · · , 4N
(N being the number of Dirac elds).
The fermion number conguration at each time is thus the list n(t) = (F (1), · · · , F (L)). While the non-relativistic de Broglie-Bohm theory regards (ψ, Q i ) to be the complete specication of the state of a system, this model considers the pair (|ψ , n) (with |ψ being the state vector).
The task is now to nd the proper dynamics for this pair. For the state vector the usual evolution
is considered (in the followingh is set to 1). Again this gives rise to a continuity equation:
13 However, Bell acknowledges that this beable choice is everything but unique (p.179).
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Here q and p denote additional quantum numbers such that e.g. |p, n forms a basis in Hilbert space. The n and m in the state specication denote the fermion number. Thus P n is the probability distribution for the fermion number conguration n. While ordinary quantum mechanics (or quantum eld theory) views this as the probability to observe the system in this state, Bell views it as the probability for the system to be in this state. Therefore it is his ambition to establish an analog to the guidance equation, i.e. to describe the time evolution of this beable irrespectively of its being observed or not.
Bell prescribes a stochastic evolution 14 for the fermion number with the jump rate T nm , i.e. the probability to jump to the conguration n within the time span dt, given that the present conguration is m, is given by T nm dt. Clearly the following equation holds:
i.e. the change of P n in time is given by the jumps m → n diminished by the jumps n → m. However, Equ.9 must be reconciled with condition 8, i.e. the stochastic dynamics needs to obey the continuity constraint. This leads to the condition J nm = T nm P m − T mn P n , which is for example satised by the choice:
Finally, the probability T nn dt for the system to remain in the same fermion number conguration is xed by the normalization m T mn dt = 1. Given an initial conguration of the fermion number in accordance with P n (t 0 ) = q | n, q|ψ(t 0 ) | 2 this model reproduces all predictions of ordinary quantum eld theory.
16 The physical picture is that the world describes a random walk in the fermion-number conguration space; this random walk being biased by the state |ψ(t) . Dürr et al. (2004b Dürr et al. ( , 2005 developed a similar process in the continuum for more or less any regularized quantum eld theory and call it Bell-type quantum eld theories. While their model is continuous it still includes a random processes i.e. is non-deterministic. However, work of Colin (2003) suggests that it is also possible to construct a deterministic continuum limit. The dierence between these two continuum versions of the Bell-model lies in the treatment of the vacuum. Dürr et al. take it to be the state with no particle-beables. In contrast does Colin's model introduce particle beables for every negative energy solution, i.e. invokes the Dirac sea concept. Thereby the conguration space becomes innite dimensional, i.e. does not possess a Lebesgue volume measure. As mentioned before in the context of eld-beables this introduces problems for a rigorous denition of an equivariant measure (Tumulka 2006, p.15) .
Some remarks on theory-generalization
In Sec.4.1 we have argued that having beables qualies a theory as Bohm-like.
Further more we have used the expression Bohm-like and generalization of the de Broglie-Bohm theory synonymously. However, there seem to be reasonable distinctions between these two concepts. In the remainder of that paper we want to discuss the issue of theory generalization in some more detail. We will argue that being a generalization of the de Broglie-Bohm theory is actually a more restrictive property than being Bohm-like only. We investigate whether this may help to single out a candidate from the competing models discussed in the previous section. However, we will also see that this is complicated by the fact that the concept of theory generalization is more involved than usually considered.
Do all Bohm-like models generalize the de Broglie-Bohm theory?
So far we have been discussing Bohm-like QFT or actually beable-QFT. However, we have already indicated in Sec. 4.1, that in order to regard these models as a generalization of the original theory it is reasonable to demand a specic relation between the non-relativistic formulation and these models. Very natural is the requirement that the Bohm-like QFT should include the non-relativistic de Broglie-Bohm theory as a limiting case. After all, there is no strict boundary between non-relativistic and relativistic physics and the corresponding theories should ideally merge to each other. We want to call this our preliminary criteria for theory generalization. Vink (1993 Vink ( , p.1811 investigates the relation between his generalized Bell-model and the original de Broglie-Bohm theory. He shows that the stochastic dynamics leads to the ordinary de Broglie-Bohm theory in the continuum limit. His argument is mathematically not rigorous but given that this model employs a particle-ontology from the outset it is certainly plausible to expect such a limit to exist.
The situation seems very dierent when it comes to eld-beables; for example in the Struyve-Westman model. Given that there the fermionic degrees of freedom have no beable status it is not conceivable how to obtain the non-relativistic formulation as a limiting case. One may illustrate this with the example of the hydrogen atom. In the de Broglie-Bohm theory the physical picture of this system is a particle-beable (assigned to the electron) distributed according to |ψ| Thus, the criteria whether a Bohm-like QFT includes the de Broglie-Bohm theory as a limiting case seems to allow an assessment of the dierent models. Rated by this measure the Bell-type models seem to be superior since they start with the same ontology as the non-relativistic formulation from the outset. But do we really have compelling arguments to make the non-relativistic formulation the touchstone for QFT generalizations? One could also be willing to modify the non-relativistic de Broglie-Bohm theory (e.g. along the lines sketched above in the hydrogen example). It seems reasonable to argue that not the non-relativistic formulation itself but only its predictions need to be recovered.
But there is even another twist in the above argument. Sofar we have employed a specic concept of theory generalization (the limiting case relation) and found that the eld-beable approach has problems to cope with it. However, one may also ask how natural the requirement of the limiting case relation actually is. In fact these and related intertheory relations have been critically examined within the philosophy of science. We will therefore say a few words on this debate and its possible impact on our question.
What does it mean to generalize a theory?
Within the philosophy of science this question is part of the study of intertheory relations (Batterman 2005) and oers some surprises.
Traditionally this and related questions were framed in the context of reductive relations between theories, i.e. the question whether a given theory T 1 (the primary theory) reduces to T 2 (the secondary theory).
17 In some sense theory generalization is the inverse operation to theory reduction. An early and inuential treatment of theory reduction was given by Nagel (1961, Chapter 11) who viewed theory reduction essentially as a relation of deduction, i.e. the laws of the secondary theory should be derivable from the laws of the primary theory.
However, this typically requires a translation of the descriptive terms of T 2 which are absent in T 1 into the T 1 -language (so-called bridge principles).
In reply to criticism against the highly idealized picture of the Nagelian account more sophisticated models of reduction have been developed (e.g. Schaner (1967 Schaner ( , 1969 , Nickles (1973) and Hooker (1981) ). Our above discussion used the notion, that a theory, T 1 , reduces to an other, T 2 , if T 2 is obtained as a limiting case, i.e. if there is a parameter, say , in the primary theory such that the laws of the secondary theory are obtained in the limit → 0. This is a modication of the Nagelian account due to Nickles (1973) . The textbook example is the relation between special relativity and classical mechanics in the limit (v/c) 2 → 0. However, if one denies the possibility to reduce a theory from a more fundamental level, the inverse move (i.e. the theory generalization) is aected as well. In what sense should a theory T 1 be regarded as a generalization of (i.e. being more fundamental than) a theory T 2 if it is not possible to recover T 2 from T 1 ? The whole talk about higher level, lower level or being more fundamental becomes void and one seems to be left over with autonomous theories.
These brief remarks shall indicate that the concept of a theory generalization is more involved than usually considered. Thus, the failure of e.g. Bohm-like QFT with eld-beables to recover the ordinary de Broglie-Bohm theory as a limiting case may be viewed rather as a generic feature in the relation between higher and lower level theories and not as a reason to reject this model.
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A simple example of a singular limit is given by Batterman (2005) . The equation x 2 + x − 9 = 0 has two roots for any value of > 0 but only one solution for the = 0 case. Thus, the character of the behavior in the case = 0 diers fundamentally from the character of its limiting (i.e. small but nite) behavior. 5 Summary and conclusion
The non-relativistic de Broglie-Bohm theory is able to give an observer independent account of all quantum phenomena. It solves the infamous measurement problem, or, to be more precise, there is no such problem in the de Broglie-Bohm theory. It serves as a counter example to the common claim that no description of quantum phenomena can be given which employs particles moving on continuous trajectories. However, like most alternative interpretations it is not experimentally distinguishable from standard quantum mechanics.
When it comes to relativistic and quantum eld theoretical generalizations one rst needs to agree upon what one actually means by a Bohm-like theory.
Seemingly a theory needs to have deterministic trajectories to count as Bohmlike. However, most Bohmians would suggest that the decisive property of the de Broglie-Bohm theory is that it attributes a beable-status to certain properties. As long as these beables provide the means to record measurement outcomes they can be used to build a Bohm-like model. Particle beables are just a specic example for this strategy. For relativistic and quantum eld theoretical generalizations several competing models do exist. These display a surprising exibility with respect to the beable-choice. Some models stick to a particle ontology while others introduce eld-beables. Further more there is no need to introduce beables for all particle species and e.g. the Struyve-Westman model does without a beable status for fermions.
21
A further investigation of the relation between these dierent models and the original de Broglie-Bohm theory seems to be an interesting case-study for what has been called intertheory relations in the philosophy of science. Possibly an assessment of these models could be based on the result.
Be that as it may, the common claim that the de Broglie-Bohm theory is incompatible with quantum eld theory is certainly incorrect. Agreed, all these models have a cooked-up avor, but this is due to the fact that their task is to reproduce the predictions of existing theories. These existing theories work FAPP (for all practical purposes) and the ambition of Bohm-like reformulations is not to extend their predictive power but to put them on a conceptually rm basis. Now, does this mean that every physicist should be a Bohmian? Certainly not.
But those who reject this possible quantum world should use correct arguments.
21 The question whether all particles (should) have beable status is also addressed in Goldstein et al. (2005) .
